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THE COSTS OF REGULATORY REDUNDANCY:
CONSUMER PROTECTION OVERSIGHT OF ONLINE TRAVEL
AGENTS AND THE ADVANTAGES OF SOLE FTC JURISDICTION
James C. Cooper*
Every administration in recent history has attempted to reduce
regulatory redundancies. One area of regulatory redundancy that
deserves attention is the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) and
Department of Transportation’s (DOT) consumer protection
authority over online travel agents (OTAs), which generated $111
billion in revenue in 2013. This regulatory redundancy guarantees
that two agencies will oversee OTAs, prevents harmonization of
online consumer protection policy, and is likely to impose
unnecessary costs on OTAs to adhere to two separate regulatory
regimes. The importance of this conflict will grow as privacy and
data security become preeminent consumer protection issues and
DOT expands its jurisdiction to online information providers.
Efficiency suggests the FTC as the sole consumer protection
overseer of OTAs. Only the FTC has the current capacity to
regulate all OTA activities, and it enjoys unrivaled expertise with
respect to e-commerce consumer protection. Further, in contrast
with the FTC’s ex post enforcement approach, which focuses on
actual or likely consumer harm, DOT’s ex ante regulatory
approach is ill-suited for the fast moving world of e-commerce.
Finally, the FTC faces more serious internal and external
constraints on its enforcement authority, which tends to temper the
potential for regulatory overreach. There are several possible
ways to effect this regulatory reform, ranging from the complete
abolition of DOT’s aviation consumer protection authority and the
FTC Act’s common carrier exemption, to a memorandum of
understanding between FTC and DOT that harmonizes policy.
*
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I.
INTRODUCTION
Every administration in recent history has attempted to reform
the inevitable overlaps and redundancies that arise from an evergrowing federal bureaucracy. President Reagan established the
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (“OIRA”) to
“minimize duplication and conflicts of regulations.” 1 Al Gore
famously headed President Clinton’s “Reinventing Government”
initiative, which strove to streamline government functioning and
ultimately recommended consolidation or elimination of several
agencies. 2 Most recently, President Obama issued an executive
order in an attempt to ameliorate the problem of “redundant,
inconsistent, or overlapping” regulatory requirements and assigned
his OIRA chief, Cass Sunstein, the task of pruning the regulatory
thicket. 3 There are myriad examples of agencies that have
regulatory responsibility over the same area. For example, the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and the Department of Justice
(“DOJ”) share responsibility for enforcing the antitrust laws; the
Federal Reserve, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau
(“CFPB”), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Company (“FDIC”)
share regulatory authority over banks; the Food & Drug
Administration (“FDA”) and the U.S. Department of Agriculture
(“USDA”) share regulatory authority over food safety.4 Indeed,
President Obama quipped in his 2011 State of the Union address
announcing his proposal to reduce regulatory inefficiencies, “[t]he
Interior Department is in charge of salmon while they’re in fresh
water, but the Commerce Department handles them when they’re
1

Exec. Order No. 12866, 58 C.F.R. 51,735(2)(b) (1993).
See AL GORE, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING A GOVERNMENT
THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE
REVIEW (1993).
3
Exec. Order No. 1356376, 76 C.F.R. 3821 (2011).
4
See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory
Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1146–50 (2012) (listing areas of overlapping
jurisdiction); Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181,
187 (2011) (listing areas of overlapping jurisdiction). See also GAO,-11-318SP,
OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE POSSIBLE DUPLICATION IN GOVERNMENT
PROGRAMS, SAVE TAX DOLLARS, AND ENHANCE REVENUES (2011) (finding
thirty-four areas of regulatory redundancy that could be consolidated).
2
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in saltwater. I hear it gets even more complicated once they’re
smoked.”5
One area of regulatory redundancy that deserves attention is
the FTC’s and Department of Transportation’s (“DOT”) consumer
protection authority over online travel agents (“OTAs”), such as
Travelocity, Expedia, and Orbitz. The FTC enforces Section 5 of
the FTC Act, which broadly prohibits “unfair and deceptive acts or
practices.”6 With the exception of some carve-outs, Section 5 gives
the FTC jurisdiction over almost all of the Internet economy.7
Although the FTC is barred by statute from regulating airlines
directly, it has asserted jurisdiction over OTAs. DOT also has
consumer protection authority under Section 411 of the Airline
Deregulation Act (“ADA”), which was modeled after the FTC Act
but limits its jurisdiction to air carriers and the sale of air
transportation by “ticket agents.”8 Because OTAs are considered
ticket agents, FTC and DOT have concurrent jurisdiction over
OTAs’ sales of airline tickets. Although the FTC essentially has
abdicated responsibility over OTAs’ airline ticket sales to DOT,
two forces threaten to bring this dormant conflict to life. First, as
privacy and data security have become the preeminent consumer
protection concern,9 it seems unlikely that the FTC—the national
privacy and data security cop— would be so quick to abdicate its
jurisdiction over OTAs in the event of a data breach or some other
privacy concern that may arise in connection with OTAs’ massive
collection of consumer data. Second, DOT recently has attempted
to expand its definition of “ticket agents” to cover entities that only
5

President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 5, 2011).
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006).
7
The Procrustean Problem With Prescriptive Regulation, Remarks of
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Comm’r, U.S. Federal Trade Comm’n (2014),
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/291361/140318fsf
.pdf.
8
49 U.S.C. § 41712 (2010).
9
See Julie Brill, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Keynote Address Before the
USCIB/BIAC/OECD Conference, One Year Later: Privacy and Data Security
in a World of Big and Data, THE INTERNET OF THINGS, AND GLOBAL DATA
FLOWS, 1 (March 10, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/629691/150310uscibremarks.pdf.
6
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provide information about airline fares, such as Google or Trip
Advisor.10 Online advertising, however, is squarely in the FTC’s
bailiwick.
This regulatory redundancy is bad government. It guarantees
that two agencies will oversee OTAs—DOT for air travel sales,
and FTC for hotels and rental cars—when one agency could do the
job more efficiently. Further, it prevents harmonization of online
consumer protection policy. The FTC has been the leader in
addressing consumer protection in e-commerce. Not only is such
regulatory redundancy wasteful for taxpayers, it threatens to
impose serious costs on one of the largest Internet businesses and
ultimately the consumers. The online travel industry is a key driver
of e-commerce growth, earning $111 billion in 2013, which
amounts to one-third of all e-commerce revenue.11 Almost half of
travel is booked online, with OTAs responsible for about a quarter
of this revenue.12 Having one set of rules for online sales of airline
tickets and another for the rest of the Internet also is likely to
impose unnecessary costs on this important sector associated with
adherence to two separate regulatory regimes.
Avoiding this potential regulatory conflict suggests a fix that
selects one agency to provide consumer protection oversight of
OTAs. The FTC is the clear choice. First, and perhaps most
obviously, only the FTC has the current capacity to regulate all
OTA activities, rather than merely the portion that deals with
airlines. Second, as the primary federal consumer protection
enforcer for over seventy years, the FTC enjoys unrivaled
expertise, especially with respect to e-commerce. 13 Further,

10

See infra Part II.A.
According to Phocuswright, consumers purchased $132 billion worth of
travel online in 2013, compared with $262 billion for the remainder of ecommerce revenue in 2013. See Phocuswright, U.S. Online Travel Overview,
Figure 1.11 (2014).
12
See Phocuswright, U.S. Online Travel Overview, Figures 1.11, 1.19 (2013)
(43% of travel is booked online).
13
In 1938, the Wheeler-Lea Amendments to the FTC Act gave the FTC its
consumer protection power over “unfair and deceptive acts and practices.” See
11
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complementing its experience in the field, the FTC additionally
enjoys a research capability—approximately eighty Ph.D.
economists and a long and distinguished history of producing firstrate public policy research 14 —that DOT lacks, and which has
served it well in identifying potential harms and crafting policy.
Third, DOT’s heavy-handed ex ante regulatory approach is illsuited for the fast moving world of e-commerce; FTC’s ex post
enforcement approach, which focuses on actual or likely consumer
harm, is far more nimble and likely to allow innovation to flourish.
Finally, the FTC faces more serious internal and external
constraints on its enforcement authority, which tends to produce
consensus-based action and tempers the potential for regulatory
overreach.
There are several possible ways to effect this regulatory
reform, ranging from the complete abolition of DOT’s aviation
consumer protection authority and the FTC Act’s common carrier
exemption, to a memorandum of understanding between FTC and
DOT, under which DOT will agree to defer to FTC’s consumer
protection authority over OTAs.
This paper proceeds as follows. Part II provides background on
both FTC and DOT consumer protection authority. Part III
explains the costs of redundant regulatory oversight in this area,
including its impact on “good government” and industry
efficiency. Part IV makes the case for vesting the FTC with sole
consumer protection authority over OTAs, and Part V sketches out
possible means for effecting this reform. The final Part concludes
the paper.

Section Wheeler-Lea Amendments of 1938, § 1, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52. Stat.
111, 111 (1938).
14
See FTC Bureau of Economics, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureausoffices/bureau-economics; Joshua D. Wright, How to Regulate the Internet of
Things Without Harming its Future: Some Do’s and Don’ts, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, 16–18 (May 21, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/644381/150521iotchamber.pdf.
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II.
DOT & FTC CONSUMER PROTECTION AUTHORITY
DOT and FTC consumer protection authorities have very
different origins. The DOT is an industry-specific regulator, whose
consumer protection jurisdiction over airlines and, by extension,
ticket agents, is an artifact of airline deregulation. The FTC, on the
other hand, was created over a century ago with a broad mandate
to be the nation’s consumer protection authority. Further, these
agencies exercise their mandates in completely different manners.
The DOT, especially in recent years, has chosen to promulgate
rules that lay out required conduct for airlines and ticket agents. On
the other hand, since the 1980s, the FTC has exercised its
consumer protection authority through enforcement against
practices that give rise to consumer harm.
A. The DOT’s Role
In 1978, the ADA freed commercial aviation from government
control of rates and routes. 15 Prior to the ADA, the Civil
Aeronautics Board (“CAB”) regulated all aspects of commercial
air transportation, including rates and entry.16 After the CAB was
dissolved in 1985, Congress transferred its consumer protection
authority over air travel to DOT.17 Specifically, the ADA provided
DOT the authority to “investigate and decide whether an air
carrier, foreign air carrier or ticket agent has been or is engaged in
an unfair or deceptive practice or an unfair method of competition
in air transportation or the sale of air transportation.”18 Importantly,
Congress modeled this provision after Section 5 of the FTC Act,
and DOT has looked to FTC Act precedent to decide whether an
15

Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 95959592 Stat. 1705
(1978).
16
This regulation was designed largely to guarantee “reasonable” level of
profitability for airlines. See VISCUSI, HARRINGTON, AND VERNON, THE
ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 612–13 (4th ed. 2005) [hereinafter
Viscusi et al.].
17
This decision was in large part due to the FTC’s lack of common carrier
jurisdiction. See H.R. 2862, 114th Cong. (2015).
18
49 U.S.C. § 41712. The Aviation Consumer Protection Bureau carries out
these consumer protection provisions.
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act is unfair or deceptive.19 The ADA further defines a ticket agent
as, “a person . . . that as a principal or agent sells, offers for sale,
negotiates for, or holds itself out as selling, providing, or arranging
for, air transportation.” 20 The DOT mandate allows it to adopt
regulations and to proceed with enforcement against entities within
its jurisdiction that are engaged in unfair or deceptive acts.21 It can
obtain both injunctive relief and civil penalties for violating rules.22
In recent years, DOT has exercised its consumer protection
authority through rulemaking, which mandates and proscribes
certain conduct for airlines and ticket agents. 23 In 2009, DOT
finished a two-year rulemaking process by promulgating its
Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections (“EAPP-I”) rule. 24
Among other things, this rule requires air carriers to adopt and
publish tarmac delay contingency plans and customer service
plans, publish flight delay information, and it deems “continued
delays on a flight that is chronically late” to be an unfair and
deceptive practice.25 DOT quickly followed with EAPP-II, which
requires airlines and ticket agents (including OTAs) to display the
19

See Cong. Rep. at 2860 (Section 411 “Duplicates the Authority which the
Federal Trade Commission has to protect consumers in other industries under
Section 5 of the FTC Act.”).
20
49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(45) (2012).
21
49 U.S.C. § 41712 (2010).
22
See 49 U.S.C. § 41712(a) (2010) (injunctive relief); 49 U.S.C. § 46301
(2014) (civil penalties).
23
Since the beginning of 2012, only two out of fifty-one DOT aviation
consumer protection cases were not based on regulatory rule violations. DEP’T
OF TRANSP., Consent Order, Lufthansa German Airlines, No. 2015-0002 (Jan.
22, 2015); \DEP’T OF TRANSP., Consent Order, Aviation Services, Ltd., No.
2012-0002 (Jan 27, 2012). Forty-five of these cases included violations of the
Full Fare Advertising Rule; see also Joanne W. Young & Lyndsey M.
Grunewald, Supreme Court Review of DOT Actions: An Opportunity to
Discipline Government Efforts to Re-Regulate the Industry, 25 AIR & SPACE
LAWYER 11, 15 (2013) (more recent DOT consumer protection rulemaking has
not followed the “restrained approach” that considers “compelling evidence of
consumer deception”).
24
Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,983 (Dec. 20,
2009).
25
Id.
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fare inclusive of all government fees and taxes.26 The rule also
requires air carriers to allow consumers to cancel their tickets
(purchased at least two-weeks prior to travel) within 24 hours
without penalty.27 DOT justified both rules as an effort to remedy
unfair or deceptive practices, and the D.C. Circuit recently upheld
them as a reasonable exercise of DOT’s authority.28
Last year, DOT proposed a new set of regulations that would
go further than the EAPP rules.29 Notably, the proposed rule would
expand customer service obligations to ticket agents, 30 require
large ticket agents to maintain a public list of the carriers whose
tickets they sell, and prohibit “display biases” by mandating the
order in which customer-facing search flight search products
display results.31 Importantly, this proposal also would “clarify”
DOT’s increasingly broad definition of “ticket agents” to include
websites that provide search tools for flight information, but do not
themselves sell air transportation.32 As a practical matter, this rule
26

Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,110 (Apr. 25,
2011). This full-fare advertising rule is a reversal of its policy in place since
1984, which allowed prices to exclude per capita taxes and fees as long as they
were displayed prominently. See Edward W. Sauer & Carlos P. Martins,
Regulation of Airfare Advertising in the United States and Canada, 25 AIR &
SPACE LAWYER 17, 18 (2012).
27
Id.
28
See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 687 F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
Spirit Airlines also lost a challenge to the EAPP under the First Amendment.
29
Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection
Issues, 79 Fed. Reg. 29,970 (NPRM May 23, 2014).
30
Specifically, it would require large ticket agents to provide prompt refunds
when they are due; provide an option to hold a reservation at the quoted price
without payment for 24 hours; disclose cancellation policies, and lavatory and
seating configurations; notify customers of itinerary changes in a timely manner;
and respond promptly to customer complaints. Conservation Stewardship
Program Interim Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. at 29,982–86.
31
Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection
Issues, 79 Fed. Reg. 29,970, 29,971.
32
Sites like Google and Kayak merely provide links to sites that actually sell
transportation. The proposal is designed “to make clear that all entities involved
in the sale or distribution of air transportation, including those intermediaries
that do not themselves sell air transportation and receive compensation in
connection with the sale of air transportation, are ticket agents subject to
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would bring online sites like Google, Trip Advisor, and Kayak
under DOT’s consumer protection jurisdiction as “ticket agents.”33
This would mean that they would be subject to DOT’s fare display
requirements, and would be required to show baggage fees and
code share operations. Further, these search entities would be
subject to DOT’s proposed prohibition on “display bias.”
B. The FTC’s Role
Congress gave the FTC authority to take action against “unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” 34
Although the FTC once engaged in a host of industry rulemakings
under its consumer protection authority, regulatory overreaches of
the 1960s and 1970s—and the concomitant political backlash—
led the FTC to adopt a harm-based approach that instead relies on
adjudication.35
Buoyed by the Supreme Court’s approval of an expansive
authority under Section 5, the D.C. Circuit’s approval of the FTC’s
ability to promulgate trade regulations rules under its consumer
protection authority, 36 and empowered by the 1975 MagnusonMoss Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 37 the FTC
embarked on a flurry of rulemakings in the 1970s that nearly led to
[DOT’s] regulations regarding the display of airfare information.” Transparency
of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Issues, 79 Fed. Reg.
29,970, 29,973.
33
See, e.g., Comments of Google, Inc. et al., Transparency of Airline
Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer Protection Issues, No. DOT-OST-20140056 (Sept. 19, 2014).
34
Congress added the prohibition on “unfair or deceptive acts or practices” as
part of the Wheeler-Lea Amendments in 1938. Wheeler-Lea Amendments of
1938, § 1, Pub. L. No. 75-447, 52. Stat. 111, 111 (1938). This provision has
been interpreted to form the basis of the Commission’s consumer protection
authority. See Fed. Trade Comm’n. Policy Statement of Unfairness, appended to
In re International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm.
35
See William MacLeod et al., Three Rules and a Constitution, 72 ANTITRUST
L.J. 943 (2005).
36
See FTC v. Sperry-Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972); National
Petroleum Refiners v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
37
15 U.S.C. §§ 2301–12.
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its demise. The proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back was
the proposed children’s advertising rule, which would have barred
not only all advertising to young children and the advertising of
sugary foods to older children, but also required public service
announcements to promote health.38 This ill-fated effort earned the
FTC the moniker “the national nanny” 39 and resulted in
congressional action limiting the Commission’s ability to use its
unfairness authority to promulgate advertising regulations.40
In an effort to assuage congressional concerns, the FTC issued
a series of binding policy statements that would make consumer
harm the touchstone of its consumer protection agenda. First, the
unfairness statements set up a cost-benefit framework, in which the
Commission would challenge a practice as unfair only if: (1) it
created substantial consumer injury; (2) that was not outweighed
by any benefits to consumers or to competition; and (3) it was not
reasonably avoidable by consumers. 41 The FTC’s deception
statement requires that a statement be “false or misleading” and
“material,” in the sense that it impacted the consumer’s purchasing
decision.42 In this manner, the concept of materiality acts as an
38

See MacLeod et al., supra note 35, at 942, for a full discussion of this
episode. For a discussion of the FTC’s activism against advertising, see also
JOHN E. CALFEE, FEAR OF PERSUASION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON ADVERTISING
AND REGULATION 11–15 (1997).
39
The FTC as National Nanny, WASH. POST, Mar. 1, 1978, at A22.
40
See William E. Kovacic, The FTC and Congressional Oversight of Antitrust
Enforcement, 17 TULSA L.J. 587, 665–66 (1982) (detailing these restrictions and
noting that the rancor over the FTC caused its funding to lapse twice, causing
the Agency to shut its doors).
41
The Commission first issued the Unfairness Policy Statement in 1980, and
later made it binding precedent by appending to the International Harvester
decision. See Fed. Trade. Comm’n, Policy Statement on Unfairness, appended to
In re International Harvester Co., 104 F.T.C. 949 (1984), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-unfair.htm. Congress eventually codified
the Unfairness Policy Statement with the 1994 FTC Reauthorization Act.
42
See FTC Policy Statement on Deception, appended to Cliffdale Assoc., Inc.,
103 F.T.C. 110, 175–83 (1984), http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/addecept.htm. The Commission also issued a statement on advertising
substantiation in Thompson Medical. FTC Policy Statement Regarding
Advertising Substantiation, appended to Thompson Medical Co., 104 F.T.C.
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indirect harm requirement—when a false statement is material, it
can be assumed to cause harm because it triggered a consumer
purchase that otherwise would not have happened. If the unfairness
test lays out a quasi-negligence standard (liable only when costs
are greater than the benefits), the deception test is one of strict
liability for false claims, under the assumption that false claims are
never beneficial.43
This harm-based approach has led the FTC from an agency on
the brink of extinction to a world-class consumer protection
agency.44 Since the turn of the century, it has used its unfairness
and deception enforcement authorities to craft consumer protection
policies for the Internet economy, including in the areas of online
and mobile disclosures, privacy, and data security.45
C. Concurrent FTC-DOT Consumer Protection Jurisdiction Over
OTAs
As noted above, the DOT has jurisdiction over “ticket agents,”
which are defined to include an entity that “ . . . holds itself out as

648, 839 (1984), https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/1983/03/ftc-policystatement-regarding-advertising-substantiation.
43
See J. Howard Beales III, former Director of Bureau of Consumer
Protection, The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and
Resurrection, Remarks at The Marketing & Public Policy Conference (May 30,
2003) [hereinafter Beales] (“deception analysis essentially creates a shortcut,
assuming that, when a material falsehood exists, the practice would not pass the
full benefit/cost analysis of unfairness, because there are rarely, if ever,
countervailing
benefits
to
deception”),
https://www.ftc.gov/publicstatements/2003/05/ftcs-use-unfairness-authority-its-rise-fall-and-resurrection.
This is analogous to the distinction between rule of reason and per se rules of
liability in antitrust. A rule of reason inquiry requires an explicit showing of
actual or likely harm, whereas harm is assumed to be greater than benefits from
the categories of per se illegal conduct, such as naked agreements to fix prices
or allocate markets. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Per se Violations in Antitrust
Law: Confusing Offenses with Defenses, 77 GEO. L J. 165, 179–80 (1988).
44
See James C. Cooper, Forward, in James Campbell Cooper ed., THE
REGULATORY REVOLUTION AT THE FTC: A THIRTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE ON
COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION at x (Oxford University Press 2013)
45
See infra notes 73–79 and accompanying text.
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selling, providing, or arranging for, air transportation.”46 Although
Congress clearly did not anticipate OTAs when it originally
brought ticket agents under the then-CAB’s authority, the courts
have given the definition a broad reading. In Sabre, Inc. v.
Department of Transportation for example, Sabre argued that
DOT’s interpretation of “ticket agent” that included computer
reservation systems (“CRSs”) that were unaffiliated with airlines
was an impermissible reading of the statute.47 The D.C. Circuit
disagreed, holding that the change in the CRS industry was
immaterial to whether Congress meant to allow DOT jurisdiction
over modern CRSs:
Congress did not define “ticket agents” as persons who are
travel agents, nor make the ability to issue a ticket the test of being
a ticket agent, but rather defined the words in terms of specific
activities, i.e., persons selling air transportation, offering it for sale,
or holding themselves out as selling or arranging for air
transportation. That CRSs and travel agents conduct related but
somewhat different functions in the distribution chain is . . .
irrelevant.48
To avoid duplicative and potentially contradictory regulation,
Congress exempted from FTC jurisdiction “common carriers
subject to the Acts to regulate commerce,” which the FTC Act
defines as entities “subject to regulation as interstate transportation
providers or subject to the Communications Act of 1934.” 49
Accordingly, the FTC clearly lacks jurisdiction over airlines’ ticket
sales and has admitted as much. 50 However, because OTAs are not
46

49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(45) (2012).
Sabre, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 429 F.3d 1113, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
48
Id. at 1125.
49
15 U.S.C. § 44 (2006).
50
For example, when proposing a revision to its “Guides for the Use of
Environmental Marketing Claims,” the FTC initially used an airline
advertisement as an example of a potentially deceptive claim about carbon
offsets, see Air Transport Association, Comment Letter on the Federal Trade
Commission’s Proposed Revisions to the Guides for the Use of Environmental
Marketing Claims (Dec. 10, 2010), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/public_comments/guides-use-environmental-marketing-claimsproject-no.p954501-00314%C2%A0/00314-57127.pdf.
The
statement
47
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common carriers, but merely sell tickets for common carriers, the
FTC takes the position that they are not covered by the FTC Act’s
common carrier exemption.51
Thus, it would seem that the FTC and DOT share concurrent
consumer protection jurisdiction over OTAs’ sales of airline
tickets. To this point, conflict has been avoided because the FTC
seemingly has ceded its jurisdiction over the airfare piece of OTAs
to DOT.52 Two developments suggest that regulatory conflict—and
all of its attendant costs, which are discussed below—may be
looming just beyond the horizon. First, privacy and data security
issues in e-commerce are becoming the preeminent part of the
FTC’s consumer protection portfolio.53 As an artifact of the nature
of their business and the substantial role that they play in ecommerce, OTAs collect volumes of sensitive consumer data.
Further, it is likely to be harder to compartmentalize data practices
than to design different displays for various product line offerings.
Thus, to the extent that the FTC was to extend its consumer
protection authority to data practices of OTAs based on hotels and
cars, whatever it prescribed would almost necessarily bleed into
the airline sales side, necessitating DOT and FTC coordination.54

accompanying the final version of the guidelines replaced the example of an
airline advertisement with an OTA advertisement, noting “the airline industry is
exempt from Section 5 of the FTC Act . . . . The Commission, however, has
jurisdiction over non-carrier third parties . . . .” FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE
GREEN GUIDES: STATEMENT OF BASIS AND PURPOSE 21 (2012).
51
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 50, at 21. That Congress assigned
jurisdiction over only airlines, and not ticket agents, in COPPA also suggests
that FTC and DOJ enjoy concurrent jurisdiction over ticket agents. See 15
U.S.C. § 6505(c).
52
FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 50, at 21.
53
See supra note 9, at 1.
54
Indeed, FTC and DOT met to discuss privacy issues because of their
potentially overlapping authority. See FOURTH MEETING OF ADVISORY
COMMITTEE ON AVIATION CONSUMER PROTECTION, MINUTES, (May 21, 2013)
http://www.airlineinfo.com/ostpdf88/135.pdf. At that meeting, a representative
from the FTC noted that the changing industry landscape is leading to “an
overlap between and DOT and FTC jurisdiction.” Id. at 10.
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The second circumstance that threatens to bring FTC and DOT
into conflict is DOT’s position that websites that provide flight
search tools and derive advertising revenue from this display, but
which do not themselves sell tickets, qualify as “ticket agents” for
the purpose of its consumer protection regulation.55 As explained
above, this new proposal would bring online sites like Google,
Kayak, and Trip Advisor, under its consumer protection
jurisdiction.56 As DOT expands its consumer protection jurisdiction
from its core area of expertise into online advertising sites, it will
encroach into a regulatory space that the FTC has owned since ecommerce began.
III.
THE COSTS OF REGULATORY REDUNDANCY
Regulatory duplication is widespread and almost never by
design, but rather “unintended or incidental to other aims, typically
emerging as the byproduct of the policy ad hoc process through
which agencies are designed.” 57 That is the case here. When
Congress vested consumer protection oversight over airlines to
DOT, it did so understanding that the FTC lacked jurisdiction over
common carriers.58 Congress could not have imagined OTAs, or
that by including “ticket agents” in DOT’s jurisdiction, would
create a regulatory redundancy that impacted a large share of
Internet commerce. Such redundancies give rise to two broad
inefficiencies. First, it is wasteful to have two agencies performing
essentially the same task. Second, it is costly for regulated entities
to adapt to two potentially conflicting standards.
A. Government Inefficiencies Due to Duplication of Effort and
Coordination Costs
It is wasteful for taxpayers to foot the bill for two agencies to
perform what is essentially the same function, but this is the status
55

See, e.g., Hipmunk, Inc., DOT Order 2013-8-8, Docket No. OST-20130004 (Aug. 20, 2013); see also In re Trip Advisor (2012).
56
79 Fed. Reg. at 29,973 (May 23, 2014).
57
Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 184
(2011).
58
See 15 U.S.C. § 44 (2006).
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quo with respect to OTAs. Currently, although the FTC has
claimed jurisdiction over the full gamut of OTA offerings, it has
essentially abdicated its jurisdiction with respect to airfare
offerings.59 Given DOT’s limited jurisdiction (limited only to the
sale of air transportation), the current state of affairs guarantees
that two agencies will perform oversight of OTAs when it could be
done as effectively with one.60
Potentially overlapping jurisdiction also leads to coordination
costs, which can be substantial.61 When one agency wants to take a
regulatory action, it must devote staff time to consult with its sister
agency. FTC and DOJ, for example, must coordinate in merger
reviews and antitrust investigations, as both enforce the Sherman
Act.62 These consultations can lead to ugly turf battles, which delay
investigations.63 Until recently, there appeared to be little in the
way of coordination between FTC and DOT with respect to
consumer protection authority over OTAs. As privacy and data
security have mushroomed into the top consumer protection issues,
DOT and FTC reportedly have begun to discuss their regulatory
approaches.64 Given the role that OTAs play in e-commerce, it will
be important for FTC and DOT to harmonize their approaches to
how OTAs collect, use, and store consumer data. Such
harmonization, however, is not free. It is true that when agencies
must coexist in regulatory space, coordination is preferable to the

59

This may be a rational response to unclear jurisdictional boundaries. See id.
(noting that abdication is the primary vehicle through which agencies avoid
conflict).
60
See supra Part II.A.
61
See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory
Space, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1182 (2012), [hereinafter Freeman and Rossi].
62
See MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION AND THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONCERNING CLEARANCE PROCEDURES FOR
INVESTIGATION at 5, (Mar. 5, 2002), http://www.justice.gov/atr/memorandumagreement-between-federal-trade-commission-and-antiturst-division-unitedstates.
63
Freeman and Rossi, supra note 61, at 1146, 1165–66.
64
See supra note 9, at 1.
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alternative—inconsistent policies.65 However, the ideal solution is
to avoid these costs altogether, which can be accomplished through
consolidation of functions.
B. Industry Costs From Compliance with Multiple and
Inconsistent Regulatory Regimes
Not only is overlapping jurisdiction inefficient government, it
forces industry to comply with multiple, and potentially
inconsistent regulatory regimes. This is especially the case for
OTAs given DOT’s incomplete jurisdiction; DOT can regulate
only the airfare piece of an OTA’s offering. Thus, OTAs must
comply with Section 5’s requirement for hotel and car rental
offerings, and DOT regulation for airfare offerings. Discrepancies
between FTC and DOT policies are especially troubling because
they enforce identical statutory language. As noted in Part II,
Congress designed DOT’s consumer protection authority to be a
carbon copy of the FTC’s. Having “unfair and deceptive” mean
one thing to DOT and another to FTC is the model of poor
governance and surely increases business uncertainty.
Such a scenario is not merely an academic hypothetical. Take
for example the “full fare” provisions from EAPP-II and DOT’s
most recent proposed consumer protection regulation to require
OTAs to disclose affiliations and financial arrangements that they
may have with certain airlines, and order their search results in a
“non-biased” manner.66 The FTC does not mandate such displays
or disclosures, nor require any ordering for searches. 67
Accordingly, OTAs must develop one type of display and search
algorithm for airfares and another for hotels and cars. These
requirements may be especially burdensome as mobile interfaces
play an increasingly important role in OTA sales.68

65

See Freeman and Rossi, supra note 61, at 1173–81 (noting executive branch
tools for managing duplication).
66
79 Fed. Reg. 29970 (May 23, 2014).
67
See infra note 90.
68
See Marcello Gasdia, Mobile Travel Shopping Hits Tipping Point – But PC
Still Dominates Booking (Jan. 2015), http://www.phocuswright.com/Travel-
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Another area that highlights further potential inefficiencies is
privacy and data security. As noted above, FTC, DOT, and
industry representatives recently met to discuss privacy and data
security as it relates to online booking of air travel.69 Importantly,
the DOT representative explained that it would find a privacy or
data security practice unfair under Section 41712 in broader
circumstances than the FTC would find a violation of Section 5.70
More specifically, he explained that it would target an airline or an
OTA for committing an “unfair” act or practice if its data practices
“violated a public policy” or engaged in “immoral” behavior.71
These factors represent a more stringent application of unfairness
than Section 5: the FTC jettisoned morality as an unfairness factor
in the 1980s, and can consider public policy only as an additional
factor—it alone cannot serve as the basis for a Section 5
violation. 72 Thus, OTAs must contend with two potentially
different privacy and security standards: one for data collected
from consumers related to hotel rooms and car rentals, and another
for data collected for airfares.73
IV.
THE CASE FOR THE FTC
Not only does efficiency call for eliminating costly duplicative
regulation of OTAs, but it also calls for vesting authority with the
agency best equipped to handle the task. The evidence suggests
that authority should fall to the FTC. First, as explained above,
only the FTC has current authority to oversee the entire OTA
portfolio of offerings, which allows it to enjoy scope economies in
Research/Research-Updates/2015/Mobile-Travel-Shopping-Hits-Tipping-PointBut-PC-Still-Dominates-Booking#.VhGKI0uKnx8.
69
See supra note 54.
70
See supra note 54, at 9–10.
71
See supra note 54, at 11.
72
See FTC Unfairness Policy Statement, Appended to International Harvester
Co., 104 F.T.C. 949, 1076 (1984); see also Beales supra note 43.
73
As a practical matter, it may be difficult to segregate airfare data from hotel
and car data—especially for consumers who purchase bundles of two or more
services for one itinerary. Thus, as a practical matter OTAs may adhere to DOT
standard for all data.
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enforcement.74 Second, while DOT’s roots are in the regulation of
transportation, the FTC has been the nation’s consumer protection
agency for a century, having developed substantial expertise in
advertising generally and online markets, in particular. Third, the
FTC’s ex-post enforcement-centered approach is far more flexible
than DOT’s ex-ante rule-based approach. Finally, the FTC’s
actions are subject to more stringent internal and external checks,
and the FTC is less likely to suffer from regulatory capture than
DOT.
A. Scope Economies in Enforcement
If moving oversight of OTA airfare offerings from one agency
to another merely shifted costs from one agency to another, society
should be indifferent between sole or dual jurisdiction over OTAs.
This, however, is not the case; resting sole jurisdiction with the
FTC is likely to be far less expensive and more effective for
taxpayers than shared jurisdiction.
First, leaving aside the relative institutional advantages that the
FTC enjoys in this regulatory space (discussed below), sole FTC
oversight of OTAs is more cost effective for the simple reason that
the FTC can police all OTA offerings at once—something DOT
could not perform absent Congressional expansion of its
jurisdiction. Second, given the FTC’s expertise in e-commerce,
scope economies in enforcement means that consolidating OTA
oversight with the FTC is likely to reduce total government outlays
by almost the entire amount that DOT currently devotes to OTA
consumer protection enforcement without any degradation of
consumer protection.75 Indeed, as explained in more detail below,
the FTC’s expertise and harm-centered approach is likely to
improve regulation in this space. Moreover, not only will the
FTC’s e-commerce experience provide it an advantage in
addressing the online sale of air transportation, any experience it
74

See supra Parts I.B and I.C.
This point has equal force with respect to proposed DOT jurisdiction over
websites that advertise airfares, but do not sell them. See supra notes 15–19 and
accompanying text.
75
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were to gain from policing the online sale of air transportation
would complement the remainder of its enforcement portfolio. 76
For example, the FTC recently addressed the identical issue
animating DOT’s “full fare advertising” rule. In 2012, the FTC
sent letters to 22 hotel operators warning them that failure to
disclose resort and other fees associated with hotel bookings on
their websites potentially would violate the FTC Act.77 Although
the FTC’s warning letters were targeted at hotel operators rather
than OTAs, the similarity of the consumer protection issues and
industries involved suggest that that the marginal cost for the FTC
to address any perceived problems with OTAs’ sale of airline
tickets would be close to zero.
B. Institutional Competence
The DOT was created in 1966 to oversee the nation’s interstate
transportation systems: rails, roads, and aviation.78 Its role with
respect to the commercial airline industry was that of traditional
utility regulator: through the CAB, it approved pricing, routes, and
entry based on a “just and reasonable” standard.79 Its consumer
protection jurisdiction over airline pricing was an artifact of the
political compromises involved in airline deregulation, largely due
to the fact that FTC lacked jurisdiction over common carriers,
including airlines.80 The legislative history makes clear that the
76

It is an economic truism dating back to the 1800s that combining
complements creates efficiencies. See James C. Cooper et. al., Vertical Antitrust
Policy as a Problem of Inference, 23 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 639, 643 (2005).
77
FTC Warns Hotel Operators that Price Quotes that Exclude ‘Resort Fees’
and Other Mandatory Surcharges May Be Deceptive (Nov. 28, 2012), at 28,
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2012/11/ftc-warns-hoteloperators-price-quotes-exclude-resort-fees-other. (The FTC has conducted a
large amount of research on disclosures, generally.)
78
U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, THE UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION: A BRIEF HISTORY (last accessed March 12,
2015), available at http://ntl.bts.gov/historian/history.html.
79
See Viscusi et al., supra note 16, at 612–13.
80
See H.R. Rep. No. 98-793, at 2861–62 (1984). Congress concluded that it
would have to pass separate legislation to give the FTC jurisdiction over
airlines. It was opposed to this path in large part due to a concern over the FTC’s
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consumer protection issues concerning Congress did not involve
advertising or other issues related to the sale of airline tickets.81
Rather, Congress felt that DOT would be in the best position to use
the CAB’s old consumer protection power to address issues
involving airline conduct, such as “overbooking and denied
boarding compensation, limitations on liability for lost or damaged
baggage,
smoking,
[and]
discrimination
against
the
handicapped.”82 In short, although DOT clearly enjoys substantial
expertise in the field of airline safety and industry practice, there is
nothing unique about DOT’s airline industry expertise that
provides it with an advantage in regulating OTA sales of airline
tickets. That is, DOT’s experience with the airline industry is not
likely to enhance its ability to identify practices relating to the
sales of tickets that threaten to harm consumers. In economic
jargon, because the marginal value of DOT’s airline industry
expertise to its consumer protection mission is low, the regulatory
economies of scope gained by combining consumer protection
with other regulatory issues facing airlines are likely quite small.
Regulating consumer-facing airline travel displays of OTAs and
search engines is light years from the issues that originally led
Congress to vest DOT with this consumer protection authority.
On the other hand, the FTC’s expertise is not related to one
industry, but to consumer protection across all industries; Congress
created the FTC to protect consumers from abusive marketplace
practices.83 Its pedigree as the nation’s primary enforcer against
fraud and deception in advertising since 1938 leaves it with
unsurpassed knowledge among regulatory bodies in identifying
marketing practices that are likely to harm consumers.84 In the past
year alone, the FTC brought 58 cases involving deceptive

cumbersome rulemaking process and the fact that DOT would still have
authority to review international charter flight tariffs. See id. at 2862.
81
Id. at 2862.
82
Id. at 2860.
83
Joshua D. Wright, The Antitrust/Consumer Protection Paradox: Two
Policies at War with Each Other, 121 YALE L.J. 2216, 2219–20 (2012).
84
Id.
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advertising, 85 held three consumer protection workshops, 86 and
issued guidance on a “green” product claim, weight loss claims,
and sports equipment concussion protection claims.87 Moreover,
this year the D.C. Circuit in POM Wonderful, LLC v. FTC, noted
the FTC’s “special expertise in determining what sort of
substantiation is necessary to assure that advertising is not
deceptive.”88

85

See Federal Trade Commission, Legal Resources, http://www.ftc.gov/tipsadvice/business-center/legal-resources?title=&type=case&field_consumer_
protection_topics_tid=229&field_industry_tid=All&field_date_value[min][date]
=January%201%2C%202014&field_date_value[max][date]=March%201%2C%
202015&sort_by=field_date_value&page=1
(showing
Advertising
and
Marketing cases reported from January 1, 2014 to March 1, 2015).
86
Federal Trade Commission, Fraud Affects Every Community (Oct. 29,
2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/2014/10/fraud-affectsevery-community; Federal Trade Commission, Big Data: Tool for Inclusion or
Exclusion (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/events-calendar/
2014/09/big-data-tool-inclusion-or-exclusion; Federal Trade Commission, Care
Labeling Rule (March 28, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/eventscalendar/2014/03/care-labeling-rule-ftc-roundtable.
87
See e.g., Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Staff Warns
Plastic Waste Bag Marketers That Their “Oxodegradable” Claims May Be
Deceptive (Oct. 21, 2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2014/10/ftc-staff-warns-plastic-waste-bag-marketers-their-oxodegradable;
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Alerts Major Retailers to
Concerns About Concussion Protection Claims for Athletic Mouthguards Made on
Websites (Aug. 21, 2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/ pressreleases/2014/08/ftc-alerts-major-retailers-concerns-about-concussion-protection;
Press Release, Federal Trade Commission, FTC Has Updated Guidance for
Media Outlets on Spotting False Weight-Loss Claims in Advertising (Jan. 7,
2014), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/ftchas-updated-guidance-media-outlets-spotting-false-weight-loss.
88
POM at 22; see also POM at 18 (noting the FTC’s “particular expertise” in
determining whether an advertisement sets forth an “efficacy” or
“establishment” claim); id. at 15 (“The Commission is often in a better position
than are courts to determine when a practice is deceptive within the meaning of
the Federal Trade Commission FTC Act, and that admonition is especially true
with respect to allegedly deceptive advertising since the finding of a § 5
violation in that this field rests so heavily on inference and pragmatic
judgment.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
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Not only is the FTC the preeminent agency on advertising, it
has unique expertise with respect to the Internet economy. As
Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen recently explained, the FTC
has consumer protection jurisdiction over the “vast majority of
commercial activity on the Internet,” and the agency has exercised
this jurisdiction to shape norms in online advertising, privacy, and
data security.89 For example, in the early part of the millennium,
the FTC used its Section 5 authority to force search engines to
more prominently demark paid search results from organic search
results.90 Since the early days of e-commerce, it has used its broad
Section 5 authority in an attempt to craft a uniform regulatory
approach to privacy and data security concerns. In 1998, the FTC
brought its first case against a firm for failing to live up to a
promise to care for consumers’ data.91
Since that time, the FTC has brought over 240 cases involving
privacy and data security.92 This enforcement—along with several
influential reports—has crafted current U.S. policy on data security
and privacy.93 Additionally, the FTC has been at the forefront of
addressing consumer protection issues associated with mobile
broadband communications. Last year, for example, the FTC filed
89

The Procrustean Problem With Prescriptive Regulation, Remarks of
Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, U.S. Federal Trade Commission (2014),
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/291361/140318fsf
.pdf.
90
See FTC Consumer Protection Staff Updates Agency’s Guidance to Search
Engine Industry on the Need to Distinguish Between Advertisements and Search
Results (June 25, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2013/
06/ftc-consumer-protection-staff-updates-agencys-guidance-search.
91
See GeoCities http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/9823015/geocities.
92
The FTC has brought over 130 spam and spyware cases, more than 40
general privacy lawsuits, over 50 data security cases, and over 20 cases related
to COPPA. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 2014 PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY
UPDATE 2–7 (2015), available at http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
reports/privacy-data-security-update-2014/privacydatasecurityupdate_2014.pdf.
93
See Woodrow Hartzog & Daniel Solove, The FTC’s Common Law of
Privacy, 114 COLUMBIA L. REV. 583 (2014). (In light of its expertise, Congress
chose the FTC to administer the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
(COPPA).) See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6506.
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consumer protection complaints against Google, Apple, and
Amazon for failing to disclose purchase windows for in-app
purchases.94 The FTC is also involved in litigation over AT&T’s
failure to disclose its policy of “throttling” the data of consumers
on unlimited data plans.95
The FTC also has a superior capability to engage in research
that informs consumer protection policy. Congress set up the FTC
to become a “norm-creator” in large part through studying
markets.96 To help the Commission fulfill this role, Congress gave
it the power to subpoena industries for data with which to conduct
studies.97 The FTC has used this power recently to examine privacy
issues surrounding data brokers, and currently it is collecting
information on patent assertion entities to explore the extent to
which their practices give rise to consumer protection concerns.98
The FTC also conducts several workshops every year, in which it
convenes industry experts and leading academics to gather
94

Complaint, In the Matter of Google, Inc., No. 122 3237 (Sep. 4, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140904googleplaycmpt.pdf;
Complaint, FTC v. Amazon, Inc., No. 2-14-cv-01038 (July 10, 2014),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140710amazoncmpt1.pdf;
Complaint, In the Matter of Apple, Inc., No. 112 3108 (Jan. 15, 2014), available
at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/140115applecmpt.pdf.
95
See FTC Says AT&T Has Misled Millions of Consumers with ‘Unlimited’
Data Promises, Federal Trade Commission, (Oct. 28, 2014),
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/10/ftc-says-att-has-misledmillions-consumers-unlimited-data.
96
See William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the
Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST
L.J. 929, 931 (2010) (One of the motivations for creating the FTC was to
establish “abody that could conduct investigations and prepare studies as well as
bring administrative cases, so that Section 5 litigation would be embedded in a
broad understanding of business practices and their implications.”).
97
See 15 U.S.C. § 46(c) (2006).
98
See Data Brokers: A Call for Transparency and Accountability, Federal
Trade Commission, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/databrokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf; see also Patent Assertion Entities, (PAE)
study, Federal Trade Commission, http://www.ftc.gov/policy/studies/patentassertion-entities-pae-study.

DEC. 2015]

Regulatory Redundancy

203

information about new issues. These workshops often lead to
reports recommending policy or guidance for industry.
For example, in 2009 to 2010, the FTC held a series of
workshops throughout the country to solicit opinions on privacy
and data security issues. This information gathering resulted in a
2012 report that in many ways operates as a de facto FTC policy
statement that guides industry practice in this space. 99 More
recently, the FTC released a report on privacy issues surrounding
the Internet of Things, based on a workshop of the same name a
year ago.100 Further, its workshop on “Drip Pricing” —the very
issues that animated the pricing component of the EAPP— formed
the basis for the group of warning letters sent to hotel operators
concerning failure to disclose “resort” or other fees. 101 To
summarize, Congress gave the FTC a capability that DOT lacks:
the ability to conduct in-depth studies of marketplace practices to
create legal norms.
On the whole, the FTC’s expertise easily generalizes to the
airline industry, whereas it’s unclear that expertise in the airline
99

The lack of empirical evidence and rigid cost-benefit analysis to support the
FTC’s policy recommendations in the privacy and data security area has drawn
some critics. See, e.g., Commissioner Joshua D. Wright, Dissent from Internet of
Things Report (Jan. 27, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
public_statements/620701/150127iotjdwstmt.pdf; James C. Cooper, Comment
on FTC Strategic Plan 2014-2018, (Sept. 30, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2333794.
100
The Internet of Things: Privacy & Security in a Connected World, Federal
Trade Commission, https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federaltrade-commission-staff-report-november-2013-workshop-entitled-internetthings-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf.
101
FTC Warns Hotel Operators that Price Quotes that Exclude ‘Resort Fees’
and Other Mandatory Surcharges May Be Deceptive, Federal Trade
Commission, (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2012/11/ftc-warns-hotel-operators-price-quotes-exclude-resort-fees-other.
The FTC has conducted a large amount of research on disclosures generally. See
also FTC James M. Lacko and Janis K. Pappalardo, The Effect of Mortgage
Broker Compensation Disclosures on Consumers and Competition: A
Controlled Experiment, (Feb. 2004), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/
documents/reports/effect-mortgage-broker-compensation-disclosuresconsumers-and-competition-controlled-experiment/030123mortgagefullrpt.pdf.
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industry provides any advantage in addressing consumer protection
issues surrounding the online sales of air travel.
That is, although airline industry expertise—which DOT
undoubtedly possesses—is valuable in setting safety standards or
addressing consumer issues like chronic delays or baggage issues,
it provides no advantage in addressing issues like online
advertising, privacy, or data security. Accordingly, if the FTC were
to replace DOT as the primarily regulator of airline sales on OTAs,
any reduction in institutional competence from a loss in airline
industry expertise would be more than offset by the enormous
gains in consumer protection expertise, particularly expertise on
issues surrounding the Internet economy.
C. Flexibility from Ex-Post, Harm-Based Enforcement
As a general matter, agencies typically have two tools in their
arsenals to enforce their statutory mandate: (1) ex ante rulemaking
and (2) ex post case-by-case enforcement. The former avenue
typically involves a “notice and comment” procedure, in which the
agency collects information, considers various stakeholder
viewpoints, and ultimately promulgates a regulation with the force
of law that proscribes certain practices.102 Regulated entities that
engage in these practices are consequently deemed to have violated
the relevant statutory provisions. Alternatively, under an ex post
enforcement strategy, the agency issues complaints against
regulated entities that are alleged to have engaged in conduct that
violates the relevant statutory provisions. Depending on the
agency, the case proceeds either through federal district courts or
administrative adjudication.
As noted above, DOT regulates OTAs primarily through
rulemaking that proscribes certain conduct deemed to violate
Section 41712.103 The FTC—due in large part to the backlash that
resulted from its rulemaking frenzy in the 1970s—has abandoned
rulemaking and instead relies on a case-by-case enforcement

102
103

See 5 U.S.C. § 553; Viscusi et al., supra note 16 at 23.
See supra Part II.A.
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strategy that is centered on consumer harm.104 Although most cases
are settled, the series of consent decrees together with the few
judicial and Commission decisions have created a quasi-common
law in the areas of advertising and privacy.105 As noted above, a
common law of consumer protection created by FTC enforcement
clearly has a deterrent impact on firms’ behavior. There is an
important distinction, however, in the case of the FTC’s harmcentered approach. Whereas a DOT rule proscribes a practice
entirely, Section 5 proscribes a practice only if the FTC can show
that it is harmful to consumers in each enforcement action—
directly in unfairness, and indirectly through the materiality
requirement in deception. 106 This distinction has important
implications for the relative ability of these agencies to deal with
changing conditions.
In theory, ex ante regulation and ex post enforcement can
arrive at identical regulatory regimes. Once a case has been
decided against one entity, it provides other regulated entities with
information about the agency’s enforcement posture; a successful
challenge to practice A will deter others from engaging in A just as
a rule would formally proscribe others from engaging in A. In one
important aspect, however, ex post enforcement differs from ex
ante rulemaking: flexibility. When conditions change rapidly or
entities subject to regulation vary, the same conduct may not
always violate the statute.
To explain the point more formally, consider a regulator who
must choose a level of care, X, for regulated entities to take. In the
case of consumer protection, X may be the level of substantiation
required to make a health claim, the type of disclosure needed in
an online display, or the level of data security. The higher the level
of substantiation, the greater the level of disclosure, or the more
resources devoted to making data secure (the higher the X chosen),
104

The FTC has promulgated rules pursuant to specific statutes (e.g., COPPA;
Do Not Call; Safe Guards; and Fairness to Contact Lens Consumers Act).
105
See Hartzog & Solove, supra note 93.
106
For cases that settle, the Commission need only to find “reason to believe”
that there has been a violation of the FTC Act and that accepting the settlement
is “in the public interest.” 15 U.S.C. § 45(b).
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the less likely consumers are to suffer harm (i.e., being materially
misled or having their identity stolen). Such precautions, however,
are costly; data security requires software, computer engineers, and
information about possible threats; and substantiation requires
expensive clinical trials, and extensive disclosures take valuable
space from other information and risk increasing consumer
information overload. So, the goal of the regulator should be to
require an X that minimizes total social costs (TSC)—the
summation of expected costs of consumer harm given X and the
cost for providing X:
TSC = cX + P(X)*H.
(1)
In (1), c is the cost per unit of care, X. The term P(X) is the
probability of a harmful event occurring (e.g., a data breach or a
purchase based on a misrepresentation), and it decreases as more
care is taken. Finally, H is the level of harm that occurs when a
harmful event occurs.107 If X* is the level of care that minimizes
TSC given c, P(X), and H, it is easy to see that as costs of care,
levels of harm, and harm avoidance technologies vary, so will the
level of X*. Figure 1 shows the optimal level of care as a function
of θ, which is a parameter that captures such heterogeneity. This
heterogeneity can be thought of as differences in circumstances
across regulated entities at a point in time, or as changes in
circumstances over time. I assume that higher levels of θ call for
higher levels of X.108 The distribution of θ is shown as f(θ).
A regulatory regime based on ex post enforcement is far more
able than one based on ex ante rules to deal with this type of
heterogeneity. Because it is able to consider the facts of each case,
in theory the regulator can craft a specific X* for each level of θ.
Ex ante rulemaking, on the other hand, will craft a single level of
care, which will leave a large proportion of entities taking either
too much or too little care depending on their circumstances. For
example, suppose that the regulator sets X* based on 𝜃, the average
107

This is the standard model for accident liability. See Steven Shavell,
Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 177–206.
108
For example, θ could represent sensitivity to harm or lower harm
avoidance costs.
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of 𝜃, which is distributed normally as shown in Figure 1.109 From
society’s standpoint, entities facing 𝜃 > 𝜃 take too little care, and
those facing 𝜃 < 𝜃 take too much.110 Depending on the variance of
the distribution, these costs from regulatory mismatch can be
substantial. What’s more, these costs are magnified to the extent
that regulators set X* based on something other than 𝜃, which is
likely to be the case because realistically regulators will lack
sufficient information about the distribution of 𝜃. For example,
suppose a regulator over estimates the harm caused by certain
conduct and sets X* according to 𝜃 > 𝜃. As can be seen in Figure
1, most of the population suffers from this too stringent standard.
It is true that rules can change to adapt to changing
circumstances, but this process is far less nimble than altering ex
post enforcement posture. For example, if technological changes
render conduct A benign, or new economic learning suggests that A
is not harmful, the agency proceeding with an ex post enforcement
strategy will either recognize this fact and cease challenging A or it
will suffer defeats in court.111 In either case, the “rule” created by
enforcement changes, and firms will no longer be deterred from
conduct A. The formal rule that proscribes A, on the other hand,
will be far more durable. If an agency recognizes A no longer
violates the statute, then it must engage in a rulemaking procedure
to rescind the rule, a long and politically fraught process. If the
agency still clings to the belief that A is harmful, moreover, then
repeal of the rule through judicial challenge is almost impossible.
Because the FTC’s authority is triggered only with consumer
harm—directly in unfairness, and indirectly through the materiality
109

It can be shown that setting X* based on 𝜃 is optimal from an ex ante
perspective when a regulator must craft only level of care. See, e.g., Steven
Shavell, A Model of the Optimal Use of Liability and Safety Regulation, 15
RAND J. ECON. 271 (1984).
110
This is because X*(𝜃) is above X*(𝜃) for 𝜃 > 𝜃, and below X*(𝜃) for 𝜃 < 𝜃.
111
This scenario occurred with respect to vertical restraints in antitrust. New
economic learning suggesting that exclusive territories, exclusive dealing, and
resale price maintenance agreements are likely to give rise to efficiencies led the
antitrust agencies and courts to adopt a rule of reason approach to these practices
rather than a per se prohibition. See Cooper et al., supra note 76.
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requirement in deception—it can calibrate its enforcement posture
to avoid over- or under-deterrence in a manner the DOT lacks. The
Commission’s experience using Section 5 to tackle deceptive
advertising and privacy issues evidences this capacity. For
example, in the realm of advertising, the FTC has calibrated
Section 5 to adjust to the burgeoning research on the economics of
information in the 1970s and 1980s, and the concomitant shift in
Supreme Court views on commercial speech.112 The Commission’s
flexible application of Section 5 to advertising substantiation
through the so-called “Pfizer factors” analysis—an approach
recently endorsed by the D.C. Circuit 113—has been adapted to
cover industries ranging from sneakers to drugs.114 It mandates a
sliding scale of required substantiation depending on factors such
as the type of claim made, the type of product, and the
consequences of a false claim.115 In the area of privacy and data
security, the Commission has pursued an approach based on
“reasonableness,” requiring firms to increase the care taken with
the sensitivity of the data collected.116 It has used this general
framework since 1998 to assure that firms—including Internet
112

See William Macleod et al., Three Rules and a Constitution: Consumer
Protection Finds its Limits in Competition Policy, 72 ANTITRUST L. J. 943, 946
(2005).
113
See POM Wonderful, LLC v. F.T.C., 777 F.3d 478, 490–92 (D.C. Cir.
2015).
114
See Pfizer Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23 (1972); Thompson Med Co. v. FTC, 791 F.2d
189 (D.C. Cir. 1986); see also J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, In
Defense of the Pfizer Factors, in THE REGULATORY REVOLUTION AT THE FTC:
A THIRTY-YEAR PERSPECTIVE ON COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION
83, 91 (James Campbell Cooper ed. 91 (2013). The FTC applied the Pfizer
analysis to claims by Sketchers, Sketchers Will Pay $40 Million to Settle FTC
Charges, FED. TRADE. COMM’N (May 16, 2002), http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2012/05/skechers-will-pay-40-million-settle-ftc-charges-itdeceived, and Reebok, Reebok to Pay $25 Million in Consumer Refunds to Settle
FTC Charges, FED. TRADE. COMM’N (Sept. 28, 2011), http://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2011/09/reebok-pay-25-million-customer-refunds-settleftc-charges.
115
See Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. at 3064.
116
See, e.g., FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE (2012).
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economy giants such as Google, Twitter, and Facebook—keep
their promises with respect to data collection and uses, and
reasonably protect sensitive data they collect.117 More recently, the
FTC has applied Section 5 concepts to disclosures involving in-app
purchases118 and mobile broadband throttling119—issues involving
industries which would be hard to conceive just 20 years ago, let
alone at the FTC’s inception in 1914.
In short, the modern FTC has deftly adapted Section 5 to
rapidly changing consumer protection issues that have arisen with
the exponential growth in technology around the Internet. Had the
FTC relied on rulemaking to mandate specific forms of disclosure
on mobile platforms, or proscribe certain collection of data, these
standards would have rapidly become obsolete and retard
economic activity. Rules also impact innovation—when certain
conduct is proscribed, companies can be forced to take less
efficient paths. Indeed, the type of rigid rule-based regime that
DOT seems increasingly to embrace with respect to online entities
stands in stark contract to the type of “permissionless”
environment—one that allows “experimentation with new
technologies and business models . . . by default” and takes the
position that “problems, if they develop at all, can be addressed
later”—that has allowed U.S. technology companies to dominate
117

The first FTC Internet privacy cases involved deceptive data collection by
GeoCities. See GeoCities, FTC File No. 982-3015 (Fed. Trade. Comm’n Feb 12,
1999), http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/982-3015/geocities.
Subsequently, the FTC has entered into consent agreements with Google,
Google, Docket No. C-4336 (Fed. Trade. Comm’n Nov. 20, 2012),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/google-inc;
Twitter,
Twitter, Inc., FTC File No. 092-3093 (Fed. Trade. Comm’n Mar. 11, 2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/092-3093/twitter-inccorporation; and Facebook, Facebook, Inc., FTC File No. 092-3184 (Fed. Trade.
Comm’n Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/
092-3184/facebook-inc, for privacy practices alleged to have violated Section 5.
118
Apple, Inc., FTC File No. 112-3108 (Fed. Trade Comm’n January 23,
2014), https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/112-3108/apple-inc.
119
Federal Trade Commission v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 3:14-cv-04785
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/
141028attcmpt.pdf.
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the world market.120 This is not to say that FTC enforcement adapts
perfectly to all circumstances. Indeed, some of its recent actions in
the fields of privacy, data security, and advertising substantiation
have drawn criticism from prominent observers for being too
unpredictable or too stringent.121 Nonetheless, the larger point is
that even if some policies are misguided, any costs they impose on
the economy will be far less durable than ones imposed by rigid ex
ante rulemaking.
Finally, it is important to note that not only is an ex post, harmcentered enforcement approach more flexible than ex ante
rulemaking, in most circumstances it will be quicker and cheaper.
For example, DOT’s EAPP-I began with an Advanced Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking in 2007, and was not final until the end of
2009. 122 The EAPP-II rulemaking took nearly a year from the
publication of the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to the final rule,
and likely required substantial staff resources to review comments,
and to draft proposed and final rules as well as statements of basis
and purpose.123 This accounting does not include the staff time and
resources that were devoted to the project before the proposals
were made public. What is more, once adopted, DOT’s rules are
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ADAM THIERER, PERMISSIONLESS INNOVATION vii (2014).
See, e.g., J. Howard Beales, III & Timothy J. Muris, In Defense of the
Pfizer Factors, in THE REGULATORY REVOLUTION AT THE FTC: A THIRTY-YEAR
PERSPECTIVE ON COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 83, 93 (James
Campbell Cooper ed. 2013) (criticizing some of the FTC’s recent advertising
substantiation cases); Tom Lenard & Paul H. Rubin, The FTC Then and Now:
Privacy, in THE REGULATORY REVOLUTION AT THE FTC: A THIRTY-YEAR
PERSPECTIVE ON COMPETITION AND CONSUMER PROTECTION 109, 110 (James
Campbell Cooper ed. (2013) (criticizing the FTC’s privacy and data security
program); James C. Cooper, Identity Theft, Not Big Data, Should be at the Top
of the FTC’s Priority List, DAILY CALLER (Sept. 24, 2013),
http://dailycaller.com/2013/09/24/identity-theft-not-big-data-should-be-at-thetop-of-the-ftcs-priority-list/.
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Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 72 Fed. Reg. 65,233 (Nov. 20,
2007).
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Enhancing Airline Passenger Protections, 76 Fed. Reg. 23,110 (Apr. 25,
2011).
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likely to be challenged in court.124 Contrast this experience with
that of the FTC in adopting Section 5 to data collection, data
security, mobile “cramming,” throttling, sponsored search
disclosures, or in-app purchases. The FTC has been able to
leverage enforcement to address each of these novel concerns in
the past year. It did not have to wait years for a rulemaking.
D. External and Internal Constraints
Internal and external constraints play a large role in shaping the
field of possible regulatory outcomes. Because the FTC is subject
to more searching judicial review, and enjoys internal procedures
that are likely to temper regulatory overreach, its actions are more
likely than DOT’s to provide consumers with net benefits. Finally,
because the FTC is not a sectorial regulator, it is unlikely to suffer
regulatory capture.
1. Judicial Review
To the extent that DOT continues to exercise its consumer
protection jurisdiction through rules rather than adjudication, it
will face a lower level of judicial scrutiny than the FTC.125 Agency
rules promulgated through informal rulemaking—the “notice and
comment” procedure that DOT uses to promulgate rules under
Section 41712—can be set aside if they are “arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”126
This standard is highly deferential to the agency’s decision: “The
scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is
narrow and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency.”127 For example, in Spirit Airlines v. DOT, which involved
a challenge to DOT’s “refund rule,” the D.C. Circuit explained that
under the “arbitrary and capricious standard,” “agencies are not
124

See, e.g., Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp. 687 F.3d 403 (D.C. Cir.
2012); Sabre, Inc. v. Dep’t of Transp., 429 F.3d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
125
See JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JOHN M. VERNON & W. KIPP VISCUSI,
ECONOMIES OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION, 23 REGULATION (2005) (“[T]here
are very few binding external controls on the development of regulation”).
126
See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706.
127
Motor Vehicles Mfg. Ass’n v. State Farm Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 30
(1983).
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required to choose the best solution, only a reasonable one.”128 In
instances in which DOT regulates by interpreting a definition in its
statute, as long as the term is open to differing definitions, courts
must defer to any “reasonable” interpretation made by the
administrator of an executive agency.129 The DOT receives even
more deference when it regulates by modifying its existing rules—
as it did when adopting the airfare advertising requirements under
EAPP-II. 130 Courts “give substantial deference to an agency’s
interpretation of its own regulations,” striking it down only if the
interpretation is “plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the
regulation.”131
In consumer protection adjudication, the FTC can proceed as a
plaintiff in federal district court,132 or it can file an administrative
complaint, in which case the matter will be tried before an FTC
administrative law judge (“ALJ”). 133 When the FTC files a
complaint in district court that alleges conduct to be unfair or
deceptive under Section 5, it receives no deference; it is treated just
as any other plaintiff and must prove the elements of its claim by a
preponderance of the evidence.134 Under the administrative route,
the Commission also must prove its case by a preponderance of the
evidence before an ALJ.135 For example, in the POM trial, the
Commission needed four experts—each subject to crossexamination—to prove that consumers reasonably took away
certain unsubstantiated claims from each of POM’s ads.136 Either
party can appeal the ALJ’s ruling to the full Commission, and a
defendant can appeal an adverse Commission decision to a federal
appeals court, and ultimately to the Supreme Court.
128

Spirit, 687 F.3d at 416 (quoting Petal Gas Storage LLP v. FERC, 496 F.3d
695, 703 (2007)).
129
See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S.
837, 844 (1984).
130
See Spirit, 687 F.3d at 416.
131
Id. at 410.
132
15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2006).
133
15 U.S.C. § 13(b).
134
See FTC v. Abbott Labs, 852 F. Supp. 526 (D.D.C. 1994).
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15 U.S.C. § 45(c) (2006).
136
See FTC v. POM Wonderful, LLC, ALJ decision at 71–84.
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When a federal appeals court reviews an FTC decision that an
act or practice was deceptive, it will uphold the Commission’s
finding if it is supported by “substantial evidence.”137 Although this
standard is deferential, it allows the court to conduct a more
searching review than the “arbitrary and capricious” standard
applied to DOT rulemaking.138 As one legal scholar explains, the
various agency review standards should be thought of as a
“grading curve set by Congress,” in which “arbitrary and
capricious, the narrowest review, is equivalent to a pass/fail,” and
the substantial evidence standard translates into allowing
regulations with “C” or “B” grades to pass.139 Even less deference
is owed the Commission for findings of unfairness. Because this
vague term is potentially so capacious, time and again courts have
reserved for themselves the last word on how to interpret the
meaning of “unfairness.” 140 Indeed, in recognition of this fact,
some legal scholars have suggested that the FTC should utilize
antitrust rulemaking to proscribe certain conduct as “unfair” so that
its findings would receive more deference in courts.141
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POM Wonderful, LLC v. F.T.C., 777 F.3d 478, 490–92 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
See Paul R. Verkuil, An Outcomes Analysis of Scope of Review Standards,
44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 679, 687–88 (2002).
139
Id. at 692688.
140
See e.g., FTC v. Boise Cascade Corp., 637 F.2d 573, 581 (9th Cir. 1980)
(“The policies calling for deference to the Commission are, of course, in tension
with the acknowledged responsibility of the courts to interpret Section 5.”); see
also Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. F. T. C., 630 F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1980 (as
to who determines what conduct violates Section 5, “The final word is left to the
courts”). See generally James C. Cooper, The Perils of Excessive Discretion:
The Elusive Meaning of Unfairness in Section 5 of the FTC Act, 34 J.
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT 87, 93–97 (2015).
141
See Royce Zeisler, Note: Chevron Deference and the FTC: How and Why
the FTC Should Use Chevron To Improve Antitrust Enforcement, 2014 COLUM.
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“fine-grained presumptions” for subsequent Section 5 litigation that will receive
Chevron deference); see Justin Hurwitz, Chevron and the Limits of
Administrative Antitrust, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 212 (2010).
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As a practical matter, these differing standards of review mean
that inefficient rules promulgated by DOT are more durable than
similar “rules” adopted by the FTC through litigation.142
Further, even if upheld by an appellate court, an FTC decision
finding unfairness or deception is far more fragile than an agency
rule that survives a legal challenge. Once challenged
unsuccessfully, an agency rule cannot be challenged again—the
rule’s provisions bind everyone subject to it. An FTC decision,
even one upheld by an appellate court, binds only the party to the
litigation. True, it serves as precedent, and as such may discourage
entities from engaging in the conduct condemned as unfair or
deceptive. This precedent, however, will apply only in the circuit
of the reviewing court. Further, decisions can be challenged and
overturned in subsequent litigation. This outcome is more likely
the more poorly reasoned or inefficient the decision.
2. Internal Procedures
The FTC’s internal makeup and procedures also constrain its
actions. To challenge conduct in district court or through
administrative litigation, a majority of commissioners must find
“reason to believe” that the conduct in question violates Section 5
and that challenging the conduct “is in the public interest.”143 This
process requires the Commission to find some evidence of
consumer harm—directly in unfairness, and indirectly through the
materiality element in deception—in every case that it approves.
The comparison with DOT is stark: there is no requirement that
the DOT find consumer harm to initiate a rulemaking proceeding.
For example, DOT’s recent “display bias” rule proposal rests
solely on “allegations” that biased displays have been used “to
disadvantage certain airlines in the course of hard-fought contract
negotiations,” and “concern[s]” that ticket agents “could sell bias
to certain airline competitors or bias displays toward carriers that
142

For example, the FTC’s authority over, and approach to data security are
being challenged in two separate proceedings currently. See LabMD, Inc. v.
FTC, 776 F.3d 1275 (11th Cir. 2015); F.T.C. v. Wyndham Worldwide Corp.,
799 F.3d 236 (3d Cir. 2015).
143
15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2006).
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pay higher segment fee[s].”144 Further, as discussed above, DOT
need only compile minimal evidence—from public comments and
even “general experience”—that a practice is generally harmful to
approve a final rule without fear of a court overturning it.145 Unlike
the FTC, moreover, DOT’s evidentiary record is never subject to
cross-examination. After the rule is in place, DOT does not
consider whether there is actual harm, but only whether a
defendant has engaged in some proscribed conduct. The
importance of this distinction cannot be overstated: the FTC can
condemn conduct only with evidence of direct or indirect
consumer harm in every case, whereas once a rule is in place, DOT
can enjoin conduct without a scintilla of evidence of actual
consumer harm.
Another important distinction that is likely to lead the FTC
toward a more reasoned approach to enforcement is that it is a
collective, rather than a unitary decision maker. Unlike DOT, the
FTC can proceed only if a majority of Commissioners vote for a
complaint. Of the five Commissioners that comprise the FTC, only
three are from the majority party, so as a practical matter minority
views are often taken into account in an effort to achieve
consensus in enforcement activities.146 Further, views within the
majority party voting block are not monolithic, so that even
enforcement actions approved by a bare majority are often the
product of consensus.
A final feature that strengthens FTC’s enforcement is that the
Commission receives separate recommendations from the Bureau
of Consumer Protection (“BCP”) and the Bureau of Economics
(“BE”) for each enforcement action. The BCP recommendation
will explain why the conduct at issue violates the relevant
144

See Transparency of Airline Ancillary Fees and Other Consumer
Protection Issues, 79 Fed. Reg. 29970-01.
145
For example, DOT relied in part on comments posted in an online chat
room (“Regulation Room”) to support its Full Fare advertising rule in EAPP-II.
See Spirit Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 687 F.3d 403, 411 (D.C. Cir.
2012).
146
The overwhelming majority of Commission actions are approved by a
unanimous vote.
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provision of the FTC Act (e.g., deception; unfairness), and in the
case of a consent order, why the proposed remedy is sufficient.147
The BE recommendation examines the economic rationale for the
case (e.g., what is the magnitude of consumer harm; does the harm
outweigh the benefit to consumers or competition), and explains
how approving an enforcement action may impact market
performance in the future.148
3. Regulatory Capture
Finally, it is worth noting that the FTC is in far less danger than
the DOT of being “captured.” Capture is a widely studied
phenomenon in which a regulator aligns its interest with the
industry it regulates.149 Capture is more likely when a regulator
faces only one industry, like DOT’s aviation consumer protection
division. 150 The FTC, on the other hand, does not have a
constituency. Its general enforcement mandate is spread over
multiple industries, meaning that there is little repeat play.151
V.
POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
Sketched out below are some possible solutions to the problem
of concurrent FTC-DOT consumer protection jurisdiction over
OTAs. The most major reforms would require congressional action
147

See, e.g., James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics
and Its Meaning for Antitrust Agency Decision Making, 8 J.L. ECON. POLICY
779, 797 (2012).
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See James C. Cooper & William E. Kovacic, Behavioral Economics and its
Implications for Regulatory Behavior, 41 J. REG. ECON. 41, 53–54 (2012).
149
JOSEPH E. HARRINGTON, JOHN M. VERNON & W. KIPP VISCUSI, ECONOMIES
OF ANTITRUST AND REGULATION, 379–80 (2005) (Capture theory “states that
either the regulation is supplied in response to the industry’s demand for
regulation . . . or the regulatory agency comes to be controlled by the industry
over time.”).
150
See id.
151
See James C. Cooper et al., Theory and Practice of Competition Advocacy
at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091, 1104 (2005); Remarks of Timothy J.
Muris, Panel Discussion, in Cooper ed., supra note 44, at 16 (explaining that
unlike the CAB or OSHA, to which “the capture theory clearly fits,” the FTC
does not have strong interest groups because most businesses “deal only
sporadically with the FTC”).
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and are likely to be the least politically feasible. Some modest
reforms, however, could be implemented to ameliorate this
situation with minimal (or no) congressional action.
The broadest reform that would eliminate the FTC-DOT
redundancy would be simultaneously to repeal Section 41712 and
the FTC’s common carrier exemption. Not only would this reform
allow the FTC to have jurisdiction over OTAs, it additionally
would provide the FTC consumer protection authority over all
manner of transportation and telecommunications services.152 Such
a reform would remove an important remaining vestige of the
regulatory era by eliminating the DOT’s ability to prescribe
regulations for the sale of air transportation and instead allowing
the market to dictate consumer practices of airlines and ticket
agents subject to the appropriate threat of FTC suit.
Of course the political feasibility of this solution is suspect: it
is doubtful that an agency or its congressional overseers willingly
would give up regulatory authority over an industry as important as
air travel.153 Indeed, the FTC has been asking for this reform for
years to no avail.154 A narrower version of this reform—repeal of
the FTC’s common carrier jurisdiction with respect to only
airlines—may be more feasible.
It should be noted that this reform was on the table in 1984
when Congress was disbanding the CAB, but rejected largely
because of the need for additional legislation, the FTC’s
cumbersome rulemaking process, and a fear that the FTC would
lack the requisite knowledge of the airline industry.155 Although
Congress still would have to pass legislation, the FTC has gone
152

Such a reform may also be more attractive given the FCC’s recent Title II
classification of consumer broadband service.
153
See Marisam, supra note 4, at 184–85.
154
See, e.g., Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission on
Consumer Privacy: Hearing Before S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Tech., 110th Cong. (2010) (statement of Jon Leibowitz, Charman of the Federal
Trade Commission), See, e.g., http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
public_statements/prepared-statement-federal-trade-commission-consumerprivacy/100727consumerprivacy.pdf.
155
See Marisam, supra note 4 and accompanying text.

218

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 17: 179

through a substantial overhaul in the last thirty years, which may
allay some Congressional fears; in 1984, the FTC’s excesses of the
1970s were probably fresh in the mind of Congress, but in the
years since, the FTC has abandoned rulemaking and has blossomed
into a responsible consumer protection enforcer with its harmbased approach. Further, the FTC has proven itself adept at
applying its consumer protection authority to all manner of
industries.
A second, more cautious approach would be to amend Section
41712 to cover only airline practices not involving advertising or
sales. At the same time, Congress could clarify that Section 5 of
the FTC Act reaches ticket agents and ticket sales by airlines
despite the common carrier exemption. For example, the DOT
would be permitted to enforce or promulgate rules that concern
things like baggage fees or tarmac delays, and the FTC would
become the sole consumer protection enforcer in the sale of airline
travel. Although it would still require congressional action, this
solution would have the political advantage of asking for less
reform and allowing DOT to retain some consumer protection
jurisdiction over airlines. This scheme also has the advantage of
freeing OTAs from having to deal with two separate regulatory
standards. Further, it would vest each agency with authority over
conduct that lies in their core competencies: airline practices with
DOT, and consumer sales with FTC.
A third, and even more cautious solution, would be merely to
remove “ticket agents” from DOT’s consumer protection
jurisdiction. The FTC already enjoys concurrent jurisdiction over
these entities, so there would be no need to amend Section 5. The
only legislative fix would be to amend Section 41712. What’s
more, in theory DOT and FTC could accomplish this reform
without legislative action: the agencies could enter into a
memorandum of understanding (“MOU”) in which DOT promises
to forebear from enforcing Section 41712 with respect to ticket
agents or to consult with the FTC and give it the right of first
refusal with respect to an action against ticket agents. Such an
arrangement could be similar to the MOU between FTC and the
CFPB with respect to consumer protection involving consumer
financial products, which requires the FTC and CFPB to

DEC. 2015]

Regulatory Redundancy

219

coordinate enforcement and policymaking to avoid “duplication of
efforts,” and “unnecessary burdens on businesses.”156 Of course,
this solution would have the downside of creating two separate
standards for online sales of air travel, one for the airlines’ site and
another for OTAs. Nonetheless, it would be preferable to the
current state of affairs that subjects OTAs to two separate
consumer protection regulators. Further, to ameliorate any
potential problems with two regulators for online air travel sales,
Congress could require FTC and DOT to harmonize their policies.
VI.
CONCLUSION
Regulatory reform is something that every administration has
strived for since the beginning of the regulatory state. Duplicative
regulatory authority not only wastes taxpayer money by requiring
two agencies to perform the same task, it risks compounding
regulatory compliance costs by subjecting covered entities to
potentially inconsistent rules. Duplicative FTC and DOT
regulation in the sale of airline transportation stands to be
especially costly. The current regulatory regime subjects OTAs to
heavy-handed regulation from DOT for their sales of airline
tickets, and FTC enforcement authority for the remainder of their
portfolio. These costs will only go up as privacy and data security
become increasingly more important to consumer protection issues
and DOT continues to expand the reach of its regulatory
requirements. Avoiding this redundancy requires selecting one
agency to provide consumer protection oversight of OTA. Given
its institutional expertise and the flexibility its harm-based
enforcement provides, the FTC is the clear choice.

156

See Federal Trade Commission, Memorandum of Understanding Between
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Federal Trade Commission
at 2 (March 12, 2015), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/
cooperation_agreements/150312ftc-cfpb-mou.pdf.
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